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ABSTRACT
Similar to many communities throughout the United States, the City of El Paso, Texas
utilizes property tax abatements as a means for inducing companies to invest in the local
economy.  Abatements in El Paso were first introduced in 1988.  Although many studies have
examined the effectiveness of municipal abatement policies, most of those efforts rely on survey
questionnaires or cross-section data sets.  This study employs a time series data set to examine
whether municipal authorities have achieved the objectives of the abatement program in El Paso.
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal policy generally depends on economic, political, and sociological characteristics of
the local jurisdiction in which it is implemented (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998).  In the hunt for
private investments, regional governments use fiscal incentives to reveal their jurisdictions as
business sanctuaries.  A fairly common tool used by municipalities to attract new companies is
the opportunity for property tax abatements.  The selective tax base diminution is seen as an
investment that will improve the general economic state of the town or city offering it.  Adoption
of the abatement mechanism often occurs as a consequence of tax mimicking neighbor
jurisdiction policies rather than careful analyses of alternatives (Revelli, 2001).  Historical
evidence and previous econometric work suggest that abatements are not as effective as their
proponents argue (Rubin, 1988).
A peculiar characteristic of this phenomenon is that cities with small tax bases often give
proportionally high abatements (Morse and Farmer, 1986; Rubin and Rubin, 1987; Reese, 1991).
Reduced commercial and industrial property tax collections imply higher tax burdens on other
fiscal contributors.  Additionally, revenues lost due to abatement ineffectiveness potentially lead
to lower quality infrastructure and education programs, as well as other municipal problems in
jurisdictions that already face a variety of difficulties.
In the case of El Paso, Texas, the first municipal property tax abatement was approved in
1988.  The abated tax amount has increased substantially since then and the number of
companies that benefit from the tax cuts grew from 1 in 1988 to 11 in 2001.  The abatement
program objective is to improve the economic well being of the area by increasing employment,
real estate values, personal income, and retail sales.  Time series data for all of the economic
variables mentioned above are available from approximately 1969 forward.  These data are
analyzed below to examine economic performance in El Paso.
Because provision of government services and public goods is highly dependent on local
taxation, municipal fiscal policy has been the object of previous research.  Examples include:
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local expenditures (Tiebout, 1956), tax mimicking among neighboring jurisdictions (Cebula,
1990; Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Revelli, 2001), tax competition among local governments
(Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Buettner, 2001), vote seeking taxation (Besley and Case, 1995),
and bequest taxes (Auten and Joulfaian, 1996).  As detailed below, property tax abatement
programs have also been analyzed on a number of occasions.
The objective of this research is to provide additional evidence on whether property tax
abatements help increase personal income, residential housing values, employment, and retail
sales in El Paso, Texas.  The analysis is more comprehensive than an earlier study that provides
evidence of tax abatement ineffectiveness using statistical causality tests (Fullerton, 2002).
Similar steps will also be used to examine the effectiveness of tax abatements for a larger
number of variables.  Another set of tests is separately deployed to garner additional insights to
economic performance during the abatements era in El Paso.
The next section provides a literature review of previous research dealing with municipal
taxes and other regional fiscal policy topics.  The third section covers data and methodologies to
be utilized.  Empirical results are discussed in the fourth section.  A summary and conclusion are
presented in the final section.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Property tax abatement is the deduction that private business entities obtain on their fiscal
obligations as an incentive for economic development.  Most taxing units in the state of Texas
are authorized to offer property tax abatements by Chapter 12 of the local taxation section of the
Texas tax code (Texas Legislature, 2001).  A taxing unit is defined as any political component in
Texas that is authorized to impose a property tax and includes counties, incorporated cities or
towns, special districts or authorities, or any other jurisdiction authorized to impose a property
tax (Texas Legislature, 2001).  It is important to note that school districts were prohibited from
entering into tax abatements programs beginning in year 2001.  The tax abatement act was
established in 1987 and currently there are 114 reinvestment and enterprise zones as they are
denominated once they grant tax abatements (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2001).
El Paso, Texas is one of those entities and provides property tax abatements with the
intent of promoting economic growth within the city.  Abatements are granted based on analyses
carried out by the Economic Development Office of the City of El Paso.  Some of the objectives
sought are greater employment, higher local wages, more tourism and increased property values.
As in many other cities, municipal authorities in El Paso adopted the abatements tool on the
presumption of policy effectiveness.
Municipal expenditure and revenue balance is fundamental for adequate functioning of
urban and metropolitan economies.  The supply of municipal services and its quality influences
the attractiveness of a given city.  Tiebout (1956) argues that public expenditures reflect the
tastes and preferences of local residents.  If governments can directly identify consumer-voters
preferences, the optimal amounts of taxation and expenditure can be determined
administratively.  Because that is difficult, communities generally use political processes as the
means to find consensus.
That model implies there is consumer-voter movement as a result of tax policies among
different jurisdictions because taxpayers seek to relocate wherever they feel satisfied with fiscal
policies.  Cebula (1990) provides an empirical examination of this concept by analyzing how the
elderly react to state income taxes.  Results indicate elderly consumer-voters choose states with
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no income taxes.  Taxpayer mobility implies that firms will prefer tax-abatement areas relative to
non-abatement areas when localities provide similar facilities and services (Wolkoff, 1985).
Earlier research indicates that municipal jurisdictions tend to emulate abatement policies
from similar or competing jurisdictions. Several articles have been published for regions in
different countries studying either tax mimicking or tax competition among jurisdictions.
Mimicking is the imitation of policies as a direct consequence of similar economic and political
conditions across communities.  Competition means that policies are a result from the effort of
two parties to secure the business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms.  Under
those circumstances, potential policy effectiveness may be assumed or perhaps even overlooked.
Buettner (2001) confirms the existence of local tax competition between more than 1000
local jurisdictions in Germany.  Using instrumental variables, various tax rates are regressed as a
function of local characteristics and possible competing jurisdictions.  Towns on the borders with
France and Switzerland are included in the investigation.  Results indicate that local jurisdictions
follow tax policy decisions of competing neighbors, but border towns show no significant cross-
border competition.
One reason local jurisdictions engage in property tax abatements is the belief that
regional competitiveness will improve (Wolkoff, 1985; 1993).  The intent is to accelerate job
creation, economic, and urban development.  Vogel (2000) states that the effectiveness of this
type of program is questionable since firm decisions to relocate depend on numerous cost
variables of which property taxes are not the most important.  Morse and Farmer (1986) survey
24 firms receiving tax abatements in Ohio.  Results show that no firm relocated, and only one
firm increased local investment, in response to tax abatements.  Fullerton (2002) performs a
series of F-tests using regression analysis.  Results indicate that tax abatements do not precede
increases in housing values, jobs, or personal income in El Paso, Texas.
Additionally, there has been debate about whether input movements solely, or ballot
results, result from fiscal adjustment.  Besley and Case (1995) examines vote-seeking behavior
evidence in governor re-election bids and two tax change data sets between states and their
neighbors.  Results demonstrate that marginally bigger positive changes in home state taxes,
relative to neighboring states, increase the probability of incumbent governor electoral defeats.
While resource flows are not found to be very sensitive to undesired tax policies, voting behavior
possibly is.
Debate over the effectiveness of property tax abatements has led to differing points of
view.  A number of empirical studies lean toward eliminating property tax abatement program
(Coffman, 1993; Fullerton, 2002) or at least making changes to secure greater efficiency
(Wolkoff, 1985; 1993).  Moreover, infrastructure and education are almost always identified, as
the principal factors that induce firms to invest in different regions (Wolkoff, 1993; Vogel,
2000).
Wolkoff (1985) suggests abatements should be granted only following extensive
analyses.  Limited abatement budgets would be approved for those projects that provide positive
benefits.  Other authors disagree. If the governments take that approach, it can lead to abatement
competition, causing firms, governments and communities to waste large volumes of resources
via escalating rent-seeking spirals (Coffman, 1993; Vogel, 2000).  Because cities in the United
States function as small open economies, Courant (1994) asserts that good local public services
can provide the ideal policy package for substituting property tax abatements.  Elimination of
property tax abatements can even, under some conditions, serve as a signal of fiscal
responsibility (Rosen and Fullerton, 1977; Papke, 1994; Fisher, 1996).
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The City of El Paso maintains annual data summaries of all property tax abatements
granted since the inception of the program in 1988.  Records provide information about the
company receiving the tax reduction and the economic impact expected from the presence of
said firm in the community.  Additional information provided by the records includes date of
contract initiation, total property holdings in El Paso, and abatement terms.  This paper takes
advantage of the availability of such data to carry out an analysis of tax abatement effectiveness.
Similar to many other metropolitan economies in the United States, data for most
variables measuring economic performance in El Paso are available from 1969 forward.
Employment, personal income, total retail sales, new housing values, gross metropolitan product,
population, and Ciudad Juárez population are the variables utilized.  These numbers are available
from the Border Region Modeling Project of the Department of Economics & Finance at the
University of Texas at El Paso (Fullerton and Tinajero, 2004).  The estimates reported therein are
obtained from a number of sources in the United States and Mexico, including government
statistical agencies as well as private consulting companies.
Although the data set is fairly unique, the sample size provided in Appendix Table 1 is
somewhat limited and imposes degree of freedom constraints on the analysis.  Given that, the
econometric techniques employed are relatively elementary.  The first involve statistical
“causality” analysis using standard F-tests and the second relies upon multiple regression
analyses with dummy variables and t-tests.
The causality tests provide a helpful starting point since one objective of the paper is to
determine whether changes in one variable (property tax abatements) precede changes in other
variables (real gross metropolitan product, median prices for existing houses, personal income,
retail sales, and employment) in a statistically reliable manner in El Paso.  Under the classic
approach, movements in Xt are said to “cause” Yt if inclusion of lags of Xt help improve the
empirical performance of an autoregressive specification for Yt (Granger, 1969).  To test whether
tax abatements cause any other of the variables the following specification is used:
Unrestricted regression Yt   =  a0  +  _ aiYt-i  +  _ bi Xt-i  +  et (1)
Restricted regression Yt   =  a0  +  _ aiYt-i  +  et  ,
where:
Yt = dependent variable in period t,
Xt-i = property tax abatements in period t-i, and
et = random disturbance term.
For example, a 2-period lag version of (1) with real gross metropolitan product as the
dependent variable, the unrestricted version of the regression equation would be specified as:
ELGMPt  =  a0  +  a1ELGMPt-1  +  a2ELGMPt-2  +  b1Xt-1  +  b2Xt-2  +  et.
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Similar specifications would be used for 1- , 3- , and 4-year lags of real gross metropolitan
product.  They would also be utilized for each of the specifications involving the other four
dependent variables targeted by the El Paso property tax abatement program (house prices,
income, retail sales, and jobs).  The restricted regression versions of (1) simply drop the lags of
each dependent variable.
The error sum squares from each of the specifications in (1) are used to perform F-tests
using the following calculation:
Fq,n-k   =   [(ESSR – ESSUR) / q] / [(ESSUR) / (N – k)] (2)
where:
ESSR = error sum of squares from the restricted equation,
ESSUR =  error sum squares from the unrestricted equation,
N =  number of observations,
k =  number of estimated parameters in the unrestricted equation,
q =  number of parameter restrictions, and
H0: bi   =  0 is the null hypothesis.
The statistic in (2) follows an F distribution with q degrees of freedom in the numerator
and N – k degrees of freedom in the denominator (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998).  Failure to
reject the null hypothesis implies that movements in X do not precede changes in Y.  Computed
F-statistics that are larger than their corresponding critical values occur when the parameter
coefficients for the various lags of X are jointly significantly different from zero.  A large
computed F-statistic does not guarantee that X “causes” Y and represents only half of the formal
test (Kennedy, 1992).  If property tax abatements do improve economic performance, however, a
statistically significant relationship should exist between the abatements and the different
indicators.
Property tax abatements were introduced in El Paso in 1988.  Abatement supporters argue
that having such an incentive program in place is necessary to signal a pro-business environment
and helps attract new investment.  To examine this possibility, an independent dummy variable
that takes on discrete values can be used (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998).  The dependent
variables (gross metropolitan product, house prices, personal income, retail sales, employment)
are regressed against El Paso population, Ciudad Juárez population, and a property tax abatement
period dummy variable (Freeman, 2001).
Yt  =  c0  +  c1ELPOPt  +  c2CJPOPt  +  c3DVt  +  ut (3)
where:
DVt   =   0 prior to 1988,
DVt   =   1 for 1988 forward, and
H0: c3   >   0.
Acceptance of the null hypothesis indicates that the value of the dependent variable has
improved during the period in which property tax abatements have been utilized.  The population
of Ciudad Juárez is included as a consequence of the geographic location of El Paso.  Economic
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activity on the north side of the border is influenced by economic conditions in its neighbor to
the south (Fullerton, 2001).
Because time series are utilized, it is possible that serial correlation may be encountered.
That problem has been previously documented in other borderplex econometric studies
(Fullerton, 2001).  If it arises in any of the equations estimated in the next section, a nonlinear
ARMAX procedure will be deployed for parameter and variance estimation (Pagan, 1974).  The
latter is a flexible methodology that can handle autoregressive, moving average, or mixed data
generating processes.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Historical data for property tax abatements, house prices, income, and total retail sales are
adjusted using the United States gross domestic product (GDP) implicit price deflator.  The base
year is 1996.   Employment data are not affected by inflation and do not have to be deflated prior
to estimation.  El Paso real gross metropolitan product data are already measured in constant
1996 dollars and also do not have to be deflated.  To deflate the four variables that require it, the
following calculation is employed:
Rt  =  Zt  /  USGDPt  (4)
where:
Zt  =  variable being deflated, and
USGDPt  =  United States GDP implicit price deflator.
Computed F-statistics for tests of whether changes abatements do not precede changes in
the other series using data in level form appear in Table 1.  In every case, the null hypothesis
fails to be rejected at the 1-percent level.  In two cases, abatements with one- and two-year lags
are found to contribute to in a statistically significant manner to explaining the variation in El
Paso GMP at less than the 5-percent level.  On balance, however, the evidence points in the other
direction.  For 14 of the 16 sets of regressions estimated, the results in Table 1 indicate that gross
metropolitan product, housing prices, personal income, retail sales, and employment are not
influenced by property tax abatements in El Paso.
In the second set of F-tests, the variables are logarithmically transformed prior to
estimation.  This practice is common when analyzing economic data for a variety of reasons,
including homoscedasticity, easier comparability, and analytical simplicity (Judge, Griffiths,
Hill, and Lee, 1980; Cox, 1990).  The property tax abatements are first adjusted by adding one to
every observation.  As frequently done in empirical analyses, that step is taken in order to permit
calculating natural logarithms for the non-abatement years prior to 1988 (Galindo and Micco,
2004).
Results shown in Table 2 share a common outcome.  All of the tests fail to reject the null
hypothesis at the 1-percent level commonly used for F-tests.  Similar to what is reported in Table
1, the hypothesis that abatements do not help explain movements in GMP comes closest to being
rejected at short lags, but worsens as lags 3 and 4.  For housing prices, personal income, retail
sales, and employment, the computed F-statistics fall well below their respective critical values
for all lags utilized.
Dummy variable tests using level data appear in Table 3.  None of the computed t-
statistics are significant at the 5-percent level commonly used for t-tests.  Those results, corrected
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for serial correlation, imply that the behaviors of the individual indicator variables did not
change significantly during the period when property tax abatements have been used as business
recruitment incentives in El Paso.  In two cases, the parameter standard deviations were
relatively smaller than those of their counterparts, but their respective signs point to opposite
conclusions.  The t-statistic for employment is significant at the 14-percent level and its
regression coefficient exhibits the positive sign expected by abatement policy proponents.  In
contrast, the parameter estimate for the median price for existing houses is significant at the 11-
percent level and its arithmetic sign is negative.
As with the causality F-tests, dummy variable least squares regressions are also computed
using logarithmically transformed data.  Overall results do not change in this group of equations
and all of the null hypotheses for the dummy variable coefficients fail to be rejected (Table 4).
For two of the dummy variable parameters, housing prices and employment, significance is
indicated at the 12- and 22-percent levels, respectively.  Once again, the housing price
coefficient sign is negative and that for employment is positive, implying that the presence of the
abatement weakens fiscal conditions in El Paso.  As with the level data specifications in Table 3,
parameter estimates in Table 4 have been corrected for serial correlation.
Evidence uncovered in this analysis supports conclusions obtained in earlier studies of
municipal tax abatement policy effectiveness.  In the specific case of El Paso, Fullerton (2002)
presents evidence that property tax abatements do not lead to increases in housing prices,
incomes, or the numbers of jobs.  In the present study, similar outcomes result for those
variables as well as for gross metropolitan product and retail sales.  Estimation of equations
containing dummy variables for the tax abatement era in El Paso also leads to similar
conclusions.
Outcomes of the four sets of tests performed suggest that property tax abatements have
not helped improve economic performance in El Paso, Texas.  Variations in the four economic
indicators included in the sample are not econometrically preceded by changes in property tax
abatements using either level or logarithmic data.  Moreover, property tax abatement dummy
variables in both level and logarithmic specifications are not statistically distinguishable from
zero.  Consequently, none of the null hypotheses can be rejected in any of the equations.
The municipal tax base in El Paso is low relative to other metropolitan economies in the
United States.  Evidence discussed herein indicates that property tax abatements apparently have
not helped improve economic conditions or expand components of the local tax base.
Accordingly, this particular development strategy should be abandoned.  Such steps have
previously been implemented by other, higher income, cities (Gavin, 2001).  Savings obtained
can be used to support infrastructure and educational investments that raise metropolitan
productivity.
As Enrich (1996) points out, these types of development policies can unintentionally take
state and local governments into a race to the bottom.  One possible mechanism for ending such
practices is provided by the Commerce Clause.  The Supreme Court has issued many decisions
among them Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, Bacchus Imports Ltd. V. Dias and
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully that can be used as a base to rule such practices as
unconstitutional.  Unfortunately, abatement policies and other tax loopholes may reflect rent
seeking and preferential treatment of select individuals (Roth, 2002).  Eliminating this element
of municipal finance in El Paso, or anywhere else, will likely be difficult and may require state
or national policy leadership from the legislative and/or judicial branches of government.
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CONCLUSION
Local governments use fiscal incentives as instruments to attract business investment to
their municipalities.  This study employs a unique data sample to provide statistical evidence
regarding property tax abatement effectiveness.  Economic indicators used in the analysis
include gross metropolitan product, residential housing values, personal income, retail sales, and
jobs.
Econometric analyses are carried out using data in level and logarithmic forms.  F-tests
indicate that changes in abatements do not precede subsequent growth in any of the indicators
selected in a statistically verifiable manner.  Similar results also occur in equations using dummy
variables designed to reflect a more “business friendly” environment during the abatement era in
El Paso public finance.
Similar to earlier studies for other municipalities, the empirical evidence gathered herein
signals that abatements are not effective in stimulating improvements in gross metropolitan
product, residential housing values, personal income, retail sales, or jobs in El Paso.  While these
results suggest that property tax abatements should be abandoned locally, they do not provide
direct information regarding other cities.  Comparative analyses would, therefore, be of interest.
Historical patterns of regional fiscal competition and tax mimicking imply that those programs
may also be ineffective.  For relatively tax-poor regions, this represents an important question
that deserves more attention.  If multi-jurisdictional information can be assembled, one potential
avenue would be to employ panel data methods such as those used in related contexts (Bollinger
and Ihlanfeldt, 2005).
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Table 1
F-Test Statistical Results, Levels
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Null Hypothesis Observations F-statistic Probability Lags
___________________________________________________________________________________________
ABT does not cause GMP 32 6.813 0.014 1
ABT does not cause GMP 31 4.388 0.023 2
ABT does not cause GMP 30 2.746 0.066 3
ABT does not cause GMP 29 2.191 0.107 4
ABT does not cause HPX 32 0.171 0.683 1
ABT does not cause HPX 31 0.302 0.742 2
ABT does not cause HPX 30 0.254 0.857 3
ABT does not cause HPX 29 0.551 0.700 4
ABT does not cause INC 33 0.021 0.885 1
ABT does not cause INC 32 0.052 0.950 2
ABT does not cause INC 31 0.379 0.769 3
ABT does not cause INC 30 0.266 0.897 4
ABT does not cause SALES 24 2.759 0.112 1
ABT does not cause SALES 23 1.342 0.286 2
ABT does not cause SALES 22 0.806 0.510 3
ABT does not cause SALES 21 0.471 0.756 4
ABT does not cause JOBS 33 0.378 0.543 1
ABT does not cause JOBS 32 0.368 0.695 2
ABT does not cause JOBS 31 0.217 0.883 3
ABT does not cause JOBS 30 0.581 0.680 4
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Acronyms:
ABT El Paso property tax abatements.
GMP El Paso gross metropolitan product.
HPX El Paso median price for existing single-family housing units.
INC El Paso personal income.
SALES El Paso gross retail sales.
JOBS El Paso total employment.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
F-Test Statistical Results, Logarithms
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Null Hypothesis Observations F-statistic Probability Lags
___________________________________________________________________________________________
ABT does not cause GMP 32 4.669 0.039 1
ABT does not cause GMP 31 3.131 0.060 2
ABT does not cause GMP 30 2.517 0.083 3
ABT does not cause GMP 29 1.581 0.218 4
ABT does not cause HPX 32 0.954 0.337 1
ABT does not cause HPX 31 0.737 0.488 2
ABT does not cause HPX 30 0.593 0.626 3
ABT does not cause HPX 29 0.392 0.812 4
ABT does not cause INC 33 0.051 0.823 1
ABT does not cause INC 32 0.422 0.661 2
ABT does not cause INC 31 0.353 0.788 3
ABT does not cause INC 30 0.375 0.824 4
ABT does not cause SALES 24 1.287 0.269 1
ABT does not cause SALES 23 0.769 0.478 2
ABT does not cause SALES 22 0.592 0.630 3
ABT does not cause SALES 21 0.272 0.891 4
ABT does not cause JOBS 33 0.002 0.961 1
ABT does not cause JOBS 32 0.784 0.467 2
ABT does not cause JOBS 31 0.656 0.587 3
ABT does not cause JOBS 30 1.550 0.224 4
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Acronyms:
ABT El Paso property tax abatements.
GMP El Paso gross metropolitan product.
HPX El Paso median price for existing single-family housing units.
INC El Paso personal income.
SALES El Paso gross retail sales.
JOBS El Paso total employment.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3
Dummy Variable Regression Coefficient Results, Levels
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variable DV Coefficient t-statistic Probability
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GMP -0.147 0.565 0.577
HPX -6200.208 1.677 0.105
INC 13.704 0.087 0.931
SALES 798.420 0.144 0.887
JOBS 4876.975 1.553 0.132
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
ARMAX serial correlation correction procedure used for parameter estimation (Pagan, 1974).
ABT El Paso property tax abatements.
GMP El Paso gross metropolitan product.
HPX El Paso median price for existing single-family housing units.
INC El Paso personal income.
SALES El Paso gross retail sales.
JOBS El Paso total employment.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4
Dummy Variable Regression Coefficient Results, Logarithms
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variable DV Coefficient t-statistic Probability
______________________________________________________________________________
GMP 0.006 0.214 0.832
HPX -0.072 1.644 0.111
INC -0.003 0.104 0.918
SALES -0.005 0.224 0.825
JOBS 0.018 1.276 0.213
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
ARMAX serial correlation correction procedure used for parameter estimation (Pagan, 1974).
ABT El Paso property tax abatements.
GMP El Paso gross metropolitan product.
HPX El Paso median price for existing single-family housing units.
INC El Paso personal income.
SALES El Paso gross retail sales.
JOBS El Paso total employment.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix-A
Property Tax Abatement and Economic Indicators Statistical Data
______________________________________________________________________________
El Paso Cd. Juárez El Paso El Paso
Property Tax Population, Population, Real GMP
Year Abatements 1000s 1000s Billion 1996$
______________________________________________________________________________
1969 0 399.777 364.022 NA
1970 0 414.908 360.462 5.33667
1971 0 428.051 369.189 5.60187
1972 0 442.941 378.364 5.91179
1973 0 457.272 398.203 6.38443
1974 0 475.919 411.532 6.49889
1975 0 491.700 427.292 6.80713
1976 0 504.994 440.333 7.17943
1977 0 520.897 450.007 7.55191
1978 0 535.742 460.611 8.11680
1979 0 550.421 472.343 8.30988
1980 0 567.365 483.711 8.41113
1981 0 589.421 497.523 8.75830
1982 0 597.774 511.892 8.67142
1983 0 624.102 521.038 8.67466
1984 0 629.000 529.668 9.07109
1985 0 685.303 538.809 9.33149
1986 0 725.610 549.592 9.49023
1987 0 734.810 559.479 9.20618
1988 54706 779.654 568.804 9.72690
1989 87834 789.010 580.982 10.22827
1990 112016 798.499 595.350 10.39273
1991 351358 835.353 608.206 10.56159
1992 451981 884.004 619.138 11.09567
1993 451624 918.794 634.044 11.52405
1994 468611 956.278 646.181 11.82335
1995 483658 1011.786 654.250 11.92600
1996 586685 1057.926 656.482 12.04200
1997 562500 1107.543 665.066 12.72600
1998 518004 1159.487 671.250 13.19300
1999 536753 1213.867 675.397 13.67700
2000 604810 1218.817 682.111 13.90000
2001 880552 1235.975 688.039 13.67800
2002 526590 1264.782 697.562 14.37300
______________________________________________________________________________
Note:
Property tax abatement data are reported in nominal dollars.
______________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix-B
Property Tax Abatement and Economic Indicators Statistical Data (continued)
______________________________________________________________________________
El Paso El Paso El Paso USA Implicit
Home Personal Retail El Paso GDP Price
Year Prices Income Sales Jobs Deflator
______________________________________________________________________________
1969 NA 1024.000 NA 154630 26.149
1970 21474 1077.729 NA 149227 27.534
1971 23369 1186.052 NA 153941 28.911
1972 25660 1289.287 NA 157454 30.166
1973 28156 1474.005 NA 171065 31.849
1974 30634 1665.274 NA 176970 34.725
1975 32419 1750.839 NA 181967 38.002
1976 33822 1973.864 NA 188723 40.196
1977 36904 2184.074 NA 192978 42.752
1978 41875 2462.736 1797.428 199707 45.757
1979 46187 2838.029 2038.546 207562 49.548
1980 53527 3171.280 2265.555 214116 54.043
1981 60661 3857.265 2356.430 222780 59.119
1982 59004 4137.470 2288.491 222226 62.726
1983 57449 4437.903 2340.684 219050 65.207
1984 59992 4875.121 2494.434 227577 67.655
1985 57931 5267.499 2782.024 232670 69.713
1986 59050 5496.991 2937.762 235294 71.250
1987 59300 5769.812 3035.190 245738 73.196
1988 59775 6183.927 3339.098 254885 75.694
1989 62750 6789.799 3563.638 264814 78.556
1990 63400 7384.805 3718.228 269821 81.590
1991 65850 7640.200 3887.059 271930 84.444
1992 67425 8407.051 4258.148 282642 86.385
1993 71675 8853.562 4546.083 290200 88.381
1994 75250 9360.739 4939.810 297093 90.259
1995 72175 9823.953 4871.536 301205 92.106
1996 76075 10164.730 5258.415 300842 93.852
1997 75825 10977.130 5050.367 309696 95.414
1998 78050 11624.420 5309.167 316662 96.472
1999 78750 11874.140 5884.997 321040 97.868
2000 80640 12545.870 6343.536 327662 100.000
2001 86250 13229.530 6354.119 325506 102.399
2002 87983 13250.600 6812.438 325037 104.092
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
Median prices for existing houses in El Paso reported in nominal dollars.
El Paso personal income reported in millions of nominal dollars.
El Paso retail sales reported in millions of nominal dollars.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
